

**Ismini Lamb Presentation to American Hellenic Institute:
“Correcting Three Popular Misconceptions about the 1922 Smyrna Catastrophe”
October 4, 2019**

I am honored to be invited to speak at the American Hellenic Institute. [SLIDE 1] I am especially happy to speak about the Smyrna catastrophe of 1922, because for the past six years I have been researching and writing about someone deeply involved in the catastrophe: George Horton. [SLIDE 2] In case you do not know him, George Horton was the American Consul serving in Smyrna from 1919 to 1922. He was present when it was burned and sacked by Turkish forces. He was a classicist, poet, author, journalist, philhellene, and well-known diplomat with decades of experience in Greece and the Ottoman Empire. He was also a Christian pacifist of sorts; I say “of sorts” because he did think democracy was worth fighting for, and as his career progressed, he also emphasized the need to use some force for humanitarian purposes on occasion. Largely forgotten today, he is still well remembered by some Greeks and Armenians for saving many lives during the destruction of Smyrna and later writing about that event in his book, *The Blight of Asia*.

Like Horton, I consider Turkey's abuse of its Christian minorities an established historical fact—as I believe the vast majority of scholars do. There is a mountain of evidence on this topic, but for my presentation this afternoon I rely on a couple of recent sources that are particularly illuminating [SLIDE 3]: Wolfgang Gust's 2014 book, *The Armenian Genocide: Evidence from the German Foreign Office Archives, 1915-1916*, and Benny Morris and Dror Ze'evi's 2019 book, *The Thirty-Year Genocide: Turkey's Destruction of Its Christian Minorities, 1894-1924*. While Gust concentrates on the Armenian Genocide, Morris and Ze'evi fully cover the persecution of the other Christian groups, including the mass murder and expulsion of Anatolian Greeks who literally had lived in Anatolia for thousands of years. By the way, that persecution began prior to the Armenian genocide. On a related point, both these sources exonerate the Ottoman Christians from charges of sedition, a charge often levied against them by Turkish sources.¹ Copies of my presentation will be available later, and for those interested, I explain why these sources are so unique and important in the footnotes.²

My primary purpose this afternoon, however, is to focus more narrowly on the city of Smyrna, and in particular its occupation by Greek forces from 1919 until 1922. I want to challenge 3 popular misconceptions about those events. [SLIDE 4] I am going to argue that:

1. The Greek occupation of Smyrna was **NOT** an act of aggression that gave rise to the Turkish Nationalist movement and led to the persecution of Christians;
2. That subsequent Greek and Turkish atrocities were **NOT AT ALL** equivalent in scope, intensity or intent;
3. And that anyone making these points is **NOT** automatically an “anti-Turkish bigot.”

To set the stage for correcting these 3 misconceptions, it will help to briefly review 5 aspects of the international context prior to the Greek occupation of Smyrna in 1919 [SLIDE 5].

1. World War I had just ended months earlier. 13 million men died in battle during the war, more than twice as many as were killed in all major wars during the previous hundred years.³ Not surprisingly, the Allied powers expected much in return for their sacrifices, from economic benefits to, “making the world safe for Democracy.”

2. One Allied war objective in particular was “the liberation of the peoples who now lie beneath the murderous tyranny of the Turks” and “the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire, which has proved itself so radically alien to Western Civilization.”⁴

3. As casualties mounted, the Allies were increasingly desperate for manpower, and willing to promise much in return for nations joining their side, which, among other things, led to competing expectations by Italians and Greeks that they would govern parts of Anatolia.

4. By the end of the war the Allies were largely exhausted, and under public pressure to quickly demobilize their armies and “bring the boys home by the Christmas” of 1919.

5. The Allies felt they had to give priority to peace with Germany. Germany was by far their most dangerous opponent. It is often forgotten that the Allies had to threaten renewed warfare to get Germany to sign the Treaty of Versailles. American troops stationed in the Rhineland mobilized for this purpose in June 1919, the month *after* the Greeks occupied Smyrna. They stood down only when the Germans responded by agreeing to sign the treaty.⁵

The upshot of all these factors was a great, underlying tension between expansive Allied war goals and their ability to achieve them. One consequence was that, unlike Germany, Turkey was never occupied by large Allied forces or policed for armistice and treaty compliance.

With that background, let me turn to the first popular misconception about the Greek occupation of Smyrna, which is that it was an act of aggression that gave rise to the Turkish Nationalist movement and the persecution of Christians in Anatolia.

In researching the Horton biography, I have read numerous sources that describe the Greek occupation as an “invasion,”⁶ and that emphasize the Greeks committed gross atrocities that led to the terrible treatment of Christian minorities in Turkey. For example, Isaiah Friedman’s well-regarded book, *British Miscalculations: The Rise of Muslim Nationalism, 1918-1925*, asserts:

The Turks, in their wildest imagination, had not expected that the Greeks would ever invade Smyrna. Even after its occupation the Turks remained relatively quiescent. Only when “the Greeks persisted in their cruelties, and continued to burn villages, massacre Turks, rape and murder their womenfolk, and kill their children” did resistance become apparent.⁷

This is all utterly false, as we shall see, but it is not hard to understand why so many people believe it. At the time virtually all experts on the Ottoman Empire considered sending Greek troops to Smyrna a colossal mistake that would greatly inflame Turkish resistance. Horton certainly thought so, telling Washington that the Greek mission “would prove a second ‘Syracusan Expedition,’” referring to the disastrous Athenian decision to invade Syracuse in 413 B.C.⁸ Horton did not think Greece had the resources to succeed, and moreover, he thought putting Greek troops in charge of policing the Turks was a terrible idea for obvious reasons.⁹

No nation puts families victimized by criminals in charge of their incarceration, and similarly, experts argued, the Allies should not have asked the Greeks to police Smyrna and its environs.¹⁰ The Turks, who despised the Greeks as their underlings, had been heavily persecuting Greeks in the Anatolian littoral throughout the war, even before they launched the Armenian genocide. Giving the Greeks the job of policing Smyrna and its surrounding areas was sure to lead to conflict, as many argued.¹¹ Thus, many assume that if the Greeks had NOT occupied Smyrna, the nationalist movement would not have taken off,¹² and Turkey's Christian minorities would have been treated better.¹³

But... that is not true. Let me give you six reasons why, paying close attention to the chronology of developments [**SLIDE 6**].

First of all, the Greek occupation of Smyrna was not an act of aggression. It was duly authorized by competent authority, consistent with international norms on war termination, and in accordance with the terms of Turkey's surrender agreement. Even so, everyone agrees, including most Greeks, that it would have been better to send other forces. So why were the Greeks sent? They were sent because the Italians forced the Allied leaders' hand¹⁴:

- When Italy did not receive territory in the Adriatic it wanted, it unilaterally sent Italian forces to Anatolia and was proceeding with plans to occupy Smyrna;
- To head this off, the Allies felt they had to dispatch a force to Smyrna to counter the Italians. But none of the major powers—Britain, France, and the United States—wanted to use their own troops for this purpose.
- The Greeks were happy to go, in part to put an end to ongoing attacks on Anatolian Greeks, in part to help Anatolian Greeks evicted by the Turks reclaim their homes and abducted family members, and in part because they aspired to eventually taking control of parts of Anatolia heavily populated by Greeks.
- In short, the Allied leaders had a dilemma. They didn't want to send the Greeks, and knew it was risky, but it seemed worse to have to dispatch their own troops, and absolutely unacceptable to do nothing and simply let the Italians grab parts of Turkey.

Thus, the Greeks were sent to Smyrna; it was not an “invasion” or act of aggression.

The second point is that the end of formal hostilities in late 1918 did NOT put a stop to Turkish persecution of Christian minorities. As Anatolian Greeks struggled to return to their homes after the end of the war, the Turks were still working to expel them. As Morris and Ze'evi note, the continuous efforts of the Turks to expel more Greeks from Anatolia *began before* the Smyrna landing.¹⁵ The Turks also resisted Allied attempts to return stolen property and abducted women and children—again, before the Greek occupation of Smyrna.¹⁶ Finally, and again before the Greek occupation of Smyrna, Turks continued to attack Christian minorities.¹⁷ This ongoing violence against Christians was relatively rare compared to what had gone on during the war, but as Morris and Ze'evi argue, it was telling because it made “Turkish intentions clear” even before the Greek landing at Smyrna.¹⁸

The third point is that well before the Greek landing at Smyrna, Turkish leaders were already organizing resistance to the Allied occupation. Historians sometimes state, or imply, the opposite. One, for example, concludes “the landing of the Greek forces ignited spontaneous resistance in Turkey. Ex-Ottoman soldiers took back the weapons they had laid down under the terms of the armistice.”¹⁹ In reality, the organization and stockpiling of weapons for resistance were already underway. In fact, immediately following the signing of the armistice agreement, the same leaders who had organized the persecution of Christian minorities during the war²⁰ “began clandestinely stockpiling arms and organizing cadres.” The Nationalists, as they were called, also set up regional organizations—called “national defense” or “national rights” committees—well before the Greek occupation.²¹ Thus, as Morris and Ze’evi observe:

Already in March 1919, two months before the Greek landing, there was a sense of impending insurrection, "to be accompanied by slaughter of Christians." Anti-Christian and Nationalist revolutionary propaganda were rampant, and [Turkish leaders] mobilized manpower and amassed weapons. The Allies were stymied in their efforts to collect guns and ammunition that the Turks were obliged to surrender.²²

Fourth, the Turks could have peacefully transferred power to Greek authorities. Instead, they set a trap, ensuring a bloody occupation of the city. As George Horton often pointed out, the Turks excelled at enforcing order when they wanted to. For example, six months before the Greek occupation, right after the Turks signed the armistice with the Allies, there had been joyous celebrations in Smyrna that led to drunken revelry and bouts of vandalism. The British asked the Turks to enforce order, and they did so quickly. A diary entry from a British expat in Smyrna at the time comments: “You should have seen how soon the Turks restored order. A few soldiers with fixed bayonets marching through the streets;” that was all it took.²³

The converse was also true; that is, whenever there was public lawlessness against Christians in Turkey, it was usually instigated by Turkish authorities—yet another point that modern scholarship has substantiated.²⁴ For example, in anticipation of the arrival of Greek forces, Turkish authorities released the inmates from the local prison—a common Turkish tactic²⁵—and the local Turkish defense committee made sure the prisoners were armed and ready to resist the occupation.²⁶ They did so, ambushing arriving Greek forces and precipitating a melee, just as the Nationalist Turks hoped.²⁷ An Allied commission of inquiry later determined the results were about 160 Greek and 300-400 Turkish casualties.²⁸

Fifth, the bloody mess might have been prevented had the Allies accompanied the Greeks ashore to jointly patrol the city and ensure a peaceful transfer of authority. The Allies were well aware of the local Turkish “self-defense” committee and the possibility of violence. They knew Nureddin Pasha²⁹ was planning a hot reception for the Allies. They demanded that he be replaced as the acting Ottoman Governor General of Smyrna, which happened just days before the arrival of the Greeks. They also carefully considered having the Turkish forts protecting Smyrna turned over to French forces who then would pass them on to the Greeks.³⁰ Strangely, however, the Allied naval commanders did not consider it necessary to accompany Greek forces and conduct joint patrols in Smyrna.³¹ Horton called the Allied failure to accompany the Greeks ashore for a peaceful transfer of authority, “the first indication of the lack of united support that ultimately caused the Greek disaster and the destruction of Smyrna.”³²

Sixth, the Greek response to Turkish provocations was NOT a rampage of violence, but a quick restoration of order. In fact, the Greek administration was harder on the Greeks who broke discipline than on the Turks who conspired to instigate the violence. Horton considered this quick restoring of order “nothing less than a miracle” given “the persecutions which the Greeks so recently suffered,” particularly since it was accomplished without help from Turkish authorities or the Allies. The new Greek Commissioner, Aristeidis Stergiadis, saw to the quick prosecution of criminals.³³ By the end of the summer, 48 Greeks, 13 Turks, 12 Armenians, and 1 Jew had been found guilty and convicted of crimes taking place following the Greek landing. Three—all Greeks—were quickly executed. Stergiadis also made certain looted property was returned to owners—Turks included.

For all these reasons,³⁴ it is clear that the Greek occupation of Smyrna was not an act of aggression. The occupation was permitted under the Mudros armistice agreement, but in any case, the Turks were already violating that agreement.³⁵ Similarly, the Turkish Nationalist movement and its persecution of Christians in Anatolia were underway months before the Greek occupation. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the occupation itself precipitated these developments.

So why do so many assume otherwise? Because, as previously mentioned, the occupation of Smyrna shocked the Turkish public into realizing the Allies were serious about partitioning Anatolia—something almost all Turks wanted to avoid at all costs. But also, the Turks proved adept at twisting the event into a propaganda coup and grossly exaggerating Greek atrocities. They convinced Turkish popular opinion, and even some international observers, that the violence they themselves had orchestrated, which led to the death of hundreds, was a general, ongoing attempt by the Greeks to exterminate all Muslims.³⁶

This perception of the Greek occupation of Smyrna astounded Horton. Although he had opposed it as unwise, he also observed that in practice the Greek administration was comparatively successful and peaceful for all ethnic groups.³⁷ This is yet another point where modern scholars have substantiated Horton's views. Morris and Ze'evi, for example, note that Greek rule was comparatively benign, and that even Turks often preferred it to living under the Turkish Nationalists.³⁸ They also acknowledge that the Greek occupation could not be the stimulus for persecution of Christian minorities because, as they said, "Turks, after all, had been massacring, raping, and, plundering Christians for decades."³⁹

What, then, explains the tragic demise of the Anatolian Christians?⁴⁰ Simply stated, I think it was the fundamental incompatibility of Allied and Turkish visions for the future of Asia Minor.

The Allies' vision was protection of Christian minorities in Turkey, and the restitution of their property and family members. In sharp contrast, the Turks were committed to their policy of "Turkey for the Turks," and determined to resist restitution for their Christian minorities. They followed this policy steadfastly both *before* the Greeks occupied Smyrna, and *after* they were forced to abandon that city.⁴¹ Given this clash of objectives, the Allies faced a fundamental dilemma. They either had to administer justice at the expense of inflaming Turkish resistance, or they had to let things be and effectively reward the Turks for committing genocide and continuing their persecution of Christian minorities. To escape the dilemma, they either had to commit forces to policing Turkey, which was unpopular with their publics, or accept the Turks policy of "Turkey for the Turks."

As history records, the Turks were more realistic about this basic dilemma than the Allies, who promoted high hopes without a willingness to sacrifice for them. In this regard, Allied policy was as clear an historical case of paving the road to hell with good intentions as the world has ever seen. The Armenians, Greeks and other Christian minorities who hoped and believed in the Allied promises of justice and democracy were set up for the cruelest of disillusionments. Mustapha Kemal's assessment of Woodrow Wilson sums it up well: "Poor Wilson," Kemal said, "did not understand that a frontier which is not defended with bayonets, force and honor cannot be secured by another principle."⁴²

Many historians acknowledge the failure of Allied idealism, but some have been quick to scapegoat the Greeks, arguing their atrocious behavior in Asia Minor was on a par with that of the Turks and indeed invited Turkish retaliation in kind. Thus, we come to the second major popular misconception about what happened in Smyrna and Anatolia more generally; that is, the belief popular in some quarters that atrocities committed by Greeks after landing in Smyrna were roughly equivalent to Turkish atrocities. That is not even remotely true.

George Horton referred to assertions that Greek and Turkish atrocities were roughly equal as the “50-50 theory,” which he considered preposterous. He asserted the sheer disparity in power between the Ottoman authorities and their Christian subjects made the argument untenable.⁴³ Morris and Ze’evi reviewed allegations of Greek atrocities in detail, but end up reaching the same conclusion Horton did. They found that the Greeks deported Turks, looted and torched villages, and occasionally murdered and raped. The Greeks did this in bouts, they conclude, usually linked to Greek military advances or retreats, and to Turkish guerrilla operations and atrocities.⁴⁴ The Greek soldiers who committed atrocities were often the Anatolian Greeks and Armenians who had suffered under the Turks for years.⁴⁵ Greek atrocities were, by definition, heinous. However, they were far, far different in scope, intensity and intent.⁴⁶

In terms of scope, Morris and Ze'evi state categorically that "All Western observers agreed that Turkish atrocities against Greeks during 1919-1923 were 'on a very much greater scale than those committed by the Greeks.'"⁴⁷ After reviewing the most lurid allegations against the Greeks, Morris and Ze'evi note they were "almost never confirmed by Western diplomats, missionaries, or journalists." Consequently, "Western diplomats came to believe that most Turkish charges were fraudulent, invented to offset Western accusations of Turkish atrocities."⁴⁸ The same held true for Turkish allegations of massacres conducted by Armenians.⁴⁹

With respect to intensity, Morris and Ze'evi argue Greek depredations cannot be compared with the slaughter and sadistic practices of the Turks. To indicate the vast differences, they cite a letter from Turkish notables to the American High Commissioner in Constantinople claiming "misdeeds, the likes of which do not exist in the annals of history." But upon examination, the misdeeds were allegations of house searches and other impositions. "There is no mention of organized massacres or mass rape or mass torture."⁵⁰ By comparison, Morris and Ze'evi found overwhelming evidence that the Turks branded, crucified, burned alive, mutilated, and stoned their victims, and conducted mass rape of both young girls and boys.⁵¹ Indeed, these two Israeli scholars reach the chilling conclusion that the Turkish persecution of their Christian minorities was far more sadistic than the Nazi's genocide of Jews.⁵²

Finally, on the critically important question of intent, Morris and Ze'evi find a major difference between the Greeks and Turks. In short, the Greeks punished perpetrators of atrocities and the Turks rewarded them.⁵³ Indeed, "as far as is known," Turkish authorities "never punished perpetrators of anti-Christian atrocities,"⁵⁴ and, in fact, they encouraged, condoned and rewarded even those guilty of the most appalling atrocities. After reviewing much evidence, Morris and Ze'evi conclude "the most murderous Turks received the greatest rewards," and that "Kemal knew how to get the worst out of his subordinates."⁵⁵ Turkish leaders also punished any righteous Turks who tried to resist the genocide or help persecuted Christians.⁵⁶

The great disparity in Greek and Turkish behaviors was due to their disparity in power, as Horton noted, but also to their differing objectives. The Greeks were trying to make a case for their ability to govern well, and thus win international sympathy for their claim to parts of Anatolia. The Turks had an entirely different goal: ethnic cleansing. They wanted to get rid of the Christians,⁵⁷ behaved accordingly, and were successful on an historic scale. Morris and Ze'evi conclude that with steady oppression, mass murder, attrition, expulsion, and forced conversion the Turks had, by 1924, cleansed Asia Minor of its four million-odd Christians.⁵⁸

Finally, I want to address the 3rd popular misconception: many people seem to think anyone arguing the Greek occupation is not to blame for Turkey's mistreatment of its Christian minorities, or that the Greek atrocities are not at all comparable to those of the Turks, must be an "anti-Turkish bigot." That's just not true.

Ever since the publication of his book, *Blight of Asia*, almost a hundred years ago, George Horton has been condemned in some circles as an anti-Turkish bigot.⁵⁹ [SLIDE 7] After studying his life at length, I am convinced he was nothing of the kind. Webster's definition of a bigot is someone "who is obstinately or intolerantly devoted to his or her own opinions and prejudices," especially someone "who regards or treats the members of a racial or ethnic group with hatred and intolerance." Horton was not obstinate or incapable of learning and changing his views, or intolerant of other groups, or full of hatred. Throughout his career he helped Muslims in need, including Turks, and admired some aspects of Turkish culture, particularly their heroic stoicism. But, when Turks were whipped into a frenzy of Christian massacres by their leaders, Horton called them out for it,⁶⁰ even though doing so effectively ended his diplomatic career.

However, as I have tried to demonstrate in this presentation, the best, most recent scholarship now agrees with Horton's conclusions about the scope, intensity and intent of Turkey's persecution of its Christian minorities. In my view, best scholarship also agrees with his conclusions about the comparatively benign Greek occupation of Smyrna. As a result, I would go so far as to say history, or at least some historians, owe George Horton an apology!

Beyond that, I would say that George Horton's view of a better future for Turkey has more merit than what actually transpired. Horton believed Turkey would be better off with an ethnically and religiously diverse population⁶¹ with common rights and civil liberties and representative government. He thought Christian mores would help elevate Turkey, and that Turks would benefit from remorse, recompense and restitution for their persecution of Christian minorities. In other words, he thought the Turkish policy of "Turkey for the Turks" was a mistake, not just for the Christian minorities, but for the Turks. Turkish leaders had another vision: one of an ethnically and religiously homogenous nation with secure borders as far as their military might could reach. They realized that vision, but that does not make Horton a bigot for saying Turkey would have benefited from more diversity and tolerance.

In closing, I would like to make a personal comment. Recently I was subjected to the same name-calling George Horton received. About a month ago someone from the Federation of Turkish-American Associations began a letter campaign protesting this presentation I have given you this afternoon, and asking the President of GU to fire me. His letters accused me of promoting propaganda and racial hatred. Happily, Georgetown disagreed and decided to defend scholarship and free speech. Even so, many who believe the evidence clearly indicates genocide took place still wonder whether we wouldn't all be better off if this deeply emotional and tragic subject was swept under the rug so to speak, so we could let bygones be bygones.

My response to that is two-fold. First, George Horton lived through the genocide he described and was profoundly affected by it. As his biographer, I have to address that. But second, and more importantly, I have come to believe it is important to acknowledge genocide for another reason: healing **[SLIDE 8]**. Victims need to forgive to free themselves from the chains of revenge. As Nazi victim, Corrie Ten Boom, has said: "To forgive is to set a prisoner free and discover the prisoner was you." It is also good for the perpetrators to be forgiven, insofar as this might encourage them to do better in the future.

But how can there be forgiveness without repentance, or repentance without honesty about what has happened? I think that is why genocide scholars attach such importance to truth commissions and testimonies of past genocides. They sometimes compare Germany, which was forced to confront its attempted genocide of Jews and other people they considered "undesirable," with other countries that committed horrible atrocities in the World Wars but have not yet fully acknowledged those acts.⁶² Such comparisons indicate the world is more likely to avoid genocidal behaviors in the future if we insist on the truth about the genocides that have taken place in the past—and that includes Turkey's genocide of its Christian minorities.

That concludes my presentation. Thank you for your kind attention.

NOTES

¹In fact, Gust concludes there was no “military necessity” for the deportations at all, as does Taner Akcam. Gust, *The Armenian Genocide*: 57, 66, 86-87; Taner Akcam, *The Young Turks' Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire*, 2013: xix; and Morris and Ze’evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*, 47-67, 383-85, 406-419.

²Gust’s conclusion from all the German reports is unequivocal: “the radical Young Turks had decided on the final annihilation of the Armenian people and carried this plan out.” Gust notes that German observers were virtually unanimous that “what happened to the Armenians in Turkey in 1915-16 was genocide” (p. 5). Gust points out that what Turkey’s Allies, the Germans, said in private about the Turkish behavior was particularly significant. Only the Germans were allowed by the Turks to pass coded messages by telegraph, thus keeping them secret and lending them a unique candor and authenticity. However, it should be noted that American consular officials also sent in reports of the genocide taking place, albeit knowing their Turkish hosts might intercept their messages. For one telling account from such a U.S. Consul, see Leslie A. Davis and Susan Blair, *The Slaughterhouse Province: An American Diplomat's Report on the Armenian Genocide*. That said, decades before Gust’s telling publication, the personal accounts of Germans and Austrians testifying to the Armenian genocide were already overwhelming. See Vahakn N. Dadrian, “Documentation of the Armenian Genocide.” Wolfgang Gust, *The Armenian Genocide: Evidence from the German Foreign Office Archives, 1915-1916*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2014: 78-79; Leslie A. Davis and Susan Blair, *The Slaughterhouse Province: An American Diplomat's Report on the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1917*. New Rochelle, N.Y.: A.D. Caratzas, Orpheus Pub, 1989; Vahakn N. Dadrian, “Documentation of the Armenian Genocide,” in Charny, Israel W. *Genocide: A Critical Bibliographic Review. Vol. 3, the Widening Circle of Genocide*. New Brunswick, U.S.A.: Transaction Publishers, 1994. As for Morris and Ze’evi, on the first page of *The Thirty-Year Genocide* the authors state unequivocally they found proofs of the Armenian genocide “incontrovertible.” Having read much of the literature on this subject, I would say *The Thirty-Year Genocide* is the one indispensable academic source on the attempted genocide of Anatolian Greeks, Armenians, Assyrians and other Christian minorities in Turkey. In reading the book carefully, I have found only two insubstantial errors based on my research of George Horton’s life, which suggests to me how painstakingly careful and balanced Morris and Ze’evi were. They identify E. C. Hole as a U.S. instead of British vice consul (p. 435), and they place Ottoman Governor-General Rahmi Bey in Smyrna (p. 429) when the city was occupied by the Greeks when I believe he had already left for Constantinople and been replaced by Izzet Bey.

³George L. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011: 3-4.

⁴This was the phrasing reported in newspapers across the United States in early January, 1917 (e.g. “Text of Allies’ Reply to President Wilson,” *The St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, January 12, 1917, page 2). The official transmission from the U.S. ambassador in Paris included an edit of an omitted phrase, and read “the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire decidedly [foreign] to Western Civilization.” See “Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State,” Telegram, Paris, January 10, 1917, 8 p.m., File No. 763.72119/370½, Papers Relating to The Foreign Relations of The United States, 1917, Supplement 1, The World War; available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1917Supp01v01/pg_6.

⁵Hunter Liggett, *Commanding an American Army: Recollections of a World War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1925): 148-153.

⁶Even scholars who know better continue to use this verb to describe the Greek occupation of Smyrna. See Morris and Ze’evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 394.

⁷Isaiah Friedman. *British Miscalculations: The Rise of Muslim Nationalism, 1918-1925*. Routledge, 2017: 33-34. Here is a fuller rendering of Friedman’s view: *The occupation of Smyrna shocked the Turkish people. Heretofore submissive and lethargic, they had now a rude awakening.... The Turks resigned themselves to the presence of British troops, which was expected to be temporary, but occupation by the Greeks, a subject people (dhimmi), who were despised, was intolerable. Unlike the British, the Greeks came to stay and nourished territorial ambitions on the ruins of the Turkish homeland. The Greeks’ brutal behavior toward innocent Turkish civilians and the ensuing chaos in Smyrna alienated them still further.... The Turks, in their wildest imagination, had not expected that the Greeks would ever invade Smyrna. Even after its occupation the Turks remained relatively quiescent. Only when “the Greeks persisted in their cruelties, and continued to burn villages, massacre Turks, rape and murder their womenfolk, and kill their children” did resistance become apparent*

Saying the Turks, “in their wildest imagination” could not have expected a Greek occupation of Smyrna is a gross exaggeration. The Turks were well aware that the Greeks desired Smyrna and that the Allies had promised territorial concessions to both Italy and Greece. Indeed, it was precisely this development—the partition of Asia Minor, that the Nationalists worked so hard to prevent from the moment the Mudros armistice was signed.

⁸George Horton report to Secretary of State, September 26th and 27th, 1922, in *Report on Turkey: USA Consular Documents*. Athens: Journalists' Union of the Athens Daily Newspapers, 1985.

9As he wrote in his diary at the time: *What is very evident to me is that the acts of savagery and violence committed by the Greeks immediately after their landing are so natural that they could have been foreseen by anyone familiar with human nature ... These people had been driven from their homes, their relatives had been murdered, their women violated... The violence in outlying districts, was committed by Greeks who had been horse-whipped, whose daughters had been raped, and who until that day had no recourse whatever but to endure.*

George made similar points in his communications to the Department of State: Horton to the State Department June 4, 1919, doc. 763.72/ 13120, U.S. Department of State, Records of the Department of State Relating to World War I and Its Aftermath, 1914-1929, vol. 138, Microcopy M367 (Washington, DC: National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1962), Roll 138; cited in Angelo Repousis, "Greek-American Foreign Relations from Monroe to Truman, 1823 to 1947," A Dissertation Submitted to the Temple University Graduate Board in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy, January, 2002: 305.

10Historians have savaged the Allied leadership for doing so, seldom delving into the dilemmas they faced, squeezed by Italian unilateral action and their own publics' resistance to delaying demobilization. Sources often quote British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour's verdict on their decision. Balfour said Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Wilson, respectively the British, French and American leaders, were "three all-powerful, all-ignorant men sitting there carving up continents with only a child to lead them"—the child presumably being 41-year-old Maurice Hankey, Britain's Secretary of War. See Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 268.

11Halide Edib, the notable Turkish novelist, nationalist, and advocate for women's rights is often quoted in this regard: *Nothing mattered to me [she wrote] from that moment (May 15th, 1919) [that is, the Greek occupation of Smyrna] to the time of the extraordinary march to Smyrna in 1922. I suddenly ceased to exist as an individual: I worked, wrote, and lived as a unit of that magnificent national madness*

For Halide Edib and many other Turks, the Greek occupation of Smyrna was a national calamity, and they rallied to the Nationalist cause. Halide Edib, *The Turkish Ordeal* (New York: The Century Co., 1928), p. 23; cited in Corinna Tsakiridou, "Ideology, Prejudice and Ethnic Conflict in George Horton's *The Blight of Asia: A Radical Narrative Reconsidered*." *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 25:1 (Spring 2001), pp. 21-38.

12Most sources imply the Nationalist movement only took off after the Greek occupation of Smyrna, and some are quite explicit on this point. Bristol's biographer, for example, insists "Due to the occupation of Smyrna, the Turkish Nationalist movement was born...." Peter Michael Buzanski, "Admiral Bristol and Turkish-American Relations, 1919-1922," Dissertation, submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History, University of California, 1960: 52.

13Many sources depict the stupidity of the decision to use Greek forces to occupy Smyrna and the inevitably cataclysmic results of doing so, implying if not stating that poor Greek behavior led to all the subsequent horrors. Often, but not always the commentator will underscore the Greek occupation was such a mistake because Turks hated Greeks, who they considered their underlings, as if Turkish sympathies after their horrid treatment of their Christian minorities was or should have been a key concern. A few, such as James Gidney, recognize there are sources who observe the Turks were already persecuting Christians and preparing to resist any partition of Asia Minor. However, he then diminishes the import of that keen observation by adding that "Even observers who called attention to the deterioration in Turkey before the landings did not dispute their accelerating effect." Lou Ureneck, makes the same point, concluding "the decision to send in the Greeks was a disaster, and it *accelerated* the slaughter of Ottoman Christians [emphasis added]." There is a huge difference between starting and accelerating. Would the Allies have been happier if the persecution had been conducted more slowly? Should anyone find that more satisfactory? The real issue is that what the Turks and the Allies wanted were two fundamentally different things. See James B. Gidney, *A Mandate for Armenia*. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1967; and Lou Ureneck, *The Great Fire: One American's Mission to Rescue Victims of the 20th Century's First Genocide*, 2015: 12-13.

14Giles Milton, *Paradise Lost: Smyrna, 1922: The Destruction of a Christian City in the Islamic World*. New York: Basic Books, 2008: 134.

15Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 397.

16Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 297.

17As Morris and Ze'evi observe: *Within weeks of the end of the Great War, Turks launched sporadic attacks on Greeks around Anatolia and Edirne vilayet. Most of the assailants were brigands and demobilized soldiers. In the Tsinik area near Samsun, according to a British observer, the Ottoman authorities had armed the Turkish villagers, and there was "a carefully laid down plan...to eliminate the Greek and Armenian elements from this district." In Edirne province, life for Christians was "a continual nightmare," a British officer reported in March, 1919 [i.e. two months before the Greek occupation of Smyrna].*

Morris and Ze'evi go on to provide examples of brigands extorting, robbing and beating Christians, and worse. The Turks also used arson, often operating "hand in hand with local gendarmes" in attempts to drive out Christians and deter others from returning Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 397.

During April, the month preceding the Greek occupation of Smyrna, security for Christians being attacked by Turkish irregular forces was the most pressing issue on the agenda for the British-led committee formed to pursue justice for persecuted Christian minorities. The group's mandate was to oversee punishment of Turkish war crimes, secure relief for impoverished populations, administer restitution to Christian minorities robbed of family members and property, recover Islamized captive youth and get falsely accused Christians out of prison. According to the April 2 minutes of the group, the committee members knew the attacks were going on "with the connivance of the Turkish military authorities," and all members agreed "that an armed military Allied force was the only possible means of settling this question (i.e. security for minorities)." Since no such force materialized, public security continued to be the group's primary concern up until the Greek landing in Smyrna and beyond. In fact, on May 16, the day after the Greek landing, the group noted the need to arm some Christian villagers "for the purpose of stopping brigand raids." Vartkes Yeghiayan, *British Reports on Ethnic Cleansing in Anatolia, 1919-1922: The Armenian-Greek Section*. Glendale, Calif: Center for Armenian Remembrance, 2007: 22, and 21-28, 44-45.

18 "The resurrected brigand 'bands will do as they did during the war' one British observer predicted. The Turks threatened 'that the Greeks and Armenians will, this time, be wiped out to a man.' The bands were led by regular Turkish army officers: 'practically the whole of the military seem to be implicated,' as were the preachers in the mosques." Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 273.

19 David Fromkin, "Gamblers on the Turkish Brink," *Military History Quarterly*, Spring 1989: 94.

20 Again, I cite Morris and Ze'evi: *Turkish recovery from the shock of defeat and the rise of the militant nationalist spirit were already apparent before the Greek landing. The recovery was spearheaded mainly by the CUP-dominated officer corps. Already in October-November 1918, CUP veterans were preparing for a protracted guerrilla struggle against possible Allied occupation. They resurrected the Special Organization [i.e. the Turkish forces operating covertly that conducted deportations and massacres of Christians] ..., amassed weapons and ammunition around Anatolia, and reconstructed the armed bands that had been active against the Armenian and Greek communities during the war.*

"CUP" is the acronym for Committee of Union and Progress, the party of Turkish leaders directing the genocide. Continuing, Morris and Ze'evi note, "Their ranks were filled by "men of bad character released convicts, etc." The budding Nationalist movement also set up a new organization, the Karakol, to protect and empower Unionist (i.e. CUP) officials in the interior. Karakol—meaning 'guard' or, literally, "black arm"—was a direct continuation of the Special Organization, and many of its founding members were SO veterans." Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 272-73.

21 Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 272.

22 Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 272.

23 The diary entry is from Grace Williamson, a British co-worshiper in George Horton's church in Smyrna. The diary relates how quickly Ottoman authorities in Smyrna could ensure public order when they wanted to. After the Turks signed the armistice with the Allies, and victory was being celebrated, Grace drew an unflattering portrait of the Greek celebration in Smyrna: *Parties of drunk men kicked up rows. And fought, smashed windows etc. In fact, they lost control of themselves. At last the commander of the English gun-boat went to the Vali and told him he must use the police to stop this fuss, that it was ridiculous. That Peace had not been signed yet and this was only an Armistice, and the Turks had a right to punish all who made fusses. You should have seen how soon the Turks restored order. A few soldiers with fixed bayonets marching through the streets.*

The diary penned by Grace Williamson (1865 Smyrna - 1945 Smyrna), is available at: <http://www.levantineheritage.com/note23.htm>.

24 Virtually any source that concludes the Turks were guilty of genocide makes the point that Turkish authorities instigated attacks on Christians by irregular forces as well as government forces. Many note the important role of the Ministry of the Interior and the so-called Special Organization. For example, see Gust, *The Armenian Genocide*: 67, 70, 75; Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 273, 397 and elsewhere; Yeghiayan, *British Reports on Ethnic Cleansing in Anatolia, 1919-1922*: 21, 103. Finally, Taner Akcam, a Turk, notes the Ottoman authorities were complicit in the genocide but also that they orchestrated its cover up while it was underway: *The deporting of the Armenians from their homeland to the Syrian deserts and their elimination, both on the route and at their final destinations, were performed under the guise of a decision to*

resettle them. The entire process was, in fact, organized and carried out in an effort to present this image.

Taner Akcam, *Killing Orders: Talat Pasha's Telegrams and the Armenian Genocide*, 2018:

25The Turks often released prisoners to conduct such crimes, including participation in massacres. See for example, Gust, *The Armenian Genocide*: 75.

26The Interallied Commission to investigate the Greek landing reached this conclusion, as have modern sources. See Milton, *Paradise Lost*: 142.

27Victoria Solomonidis, "Greece in Asia Minor: The Greek Administration of the Vilayet of Aidin, 1919-1922," Thesis, Kings College, University of London, 1984: 52-53.

28The Allied investigation concluded Greek casualties amounted to 2 soldiers killed and 6 wounded with 40 civilians killed and another 60 wounded, while the Turks lost 300-400 combatants and civilians.

29Nureddin Pasha was the formidable—not to say infamous—Ottoman general who defeated the British at Kut in 1915. He also was the Turkish leader who oversaw the sacking and burning of Smyrna for Mustapha Kemal in 1922. During that tragedy, he turned the Greek Orthodox religious leader, Metropolitan Chrysostomos Kalafatis, over to a Turkish mob to be tortured and killed. See Morris and Morris and Ze'evi's depiction of him in *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 406.

30One of the most detailed accounts of Allied leader deliberations on how to manage the Greek occupation that includes this point is found in Paul C. Helmreich, *From Paris to Sèvres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1986: 97.

31As George recounted, the night before the landing the Allied commanders of warships in Smyrna's harbor held a pow-wow to determine how best to conduct the landing: *The American commander was in favor of cooperating with the Greeks by policing the different sections of the city with Allied Marines, but... the Englishman advocated letting the Greeks "run the whole show" alone. This information is given second hand and its accuracy cannot be vouched for, but it seems probable. At any rate, the advice attributed to the American was practical, but could not be followed for evident reasons. We could not disembark because we were, as usual, "observing"; and there was such strong jealousy among the Allies regarding Asia Minor, that they could not go ashore either together or separately.*

Blight of Asia, Chapter 10.

32Ibid. As an aside, the Allies lack of unity persists to this day insofar as even the primary victims of the Turkish genocide squabble over which groups were victims of attempted genocide as opposed to merely "ethnic cleansing." For example, it wasn't until 2015 that the National Assembly of Armenia unanimously adopted a resolution recognizing both the Greek and Assyrian genocides, and the Pontic Greeks continue to believe their persecution by the Turks was uniquely horrible compared to the plight of Greeks elsewhere in Turkey, etc.

33Venizelos handpicked Stergiadis and rushed him to Smyrna because he knew Stergiadis was an expert in Islamic law, and an intrepid, uncompromising, stoic and stern man who would impose order at whatever the cost. As George reported, when Stergiadis "issued an order he expected it to be obeyed," and this was soon made known to all.

34Once it is understood that the Greeks did not invade Smyrna, but were sent there to do the will of Allied leaders who had committed their nations to dealing with Turkish persecution of Christians; that well before the Greek arrival the Turks were already violating the Mudros agreement, attacking Christians, stockpiling arms and organizing resistance to the Allied occupation; that Turkish authorities in Smyrna easily could have prevented the outbreak of violence but instead ensured it by arming and encouraging prisoners to attack the arriving Greek forces; that the other Allies also could have greatly reduced the likelihood of violence by accompanying Greek forces on joint patrols but debated and explicitly choose not to do so; that notwithstanding all the foregoing, the Greek authorities in Smyrna resolutely and harshly punished Greek malefactors, quickly restoring order—it is no longer tenable to argue that the Greek occupation of Smyrna was an act of aggression that gave rise to the Turkish Nationalist movement and led to the persecution of Christians in Anatolia. It undoubtedly did accelerate and strengthen the Nationalist movement greatly, particularly because of effective Turkish propaganda, but that is another matter (see note 36 below).

35Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 297.

36Morris and Ze'evi have quite a bit to say about Turkish propaganda and duplicity, used to good effect to disguise their objectives and whip up Turkish popular support, in part by accusing their victims of what they intended to do themselves. In September of 1919, at a nationalist gathering in Sivas, Mustapha Kemal: *advanced the narrative at the heart of the Nationalist struggle: "The non-Moslem elements with which we have led a joint existence ab antique, encouraged by the favor shown them by the Entente Powers, broke into open attacks on the dignity and rights of the Nation and State." He accused the Greek army and Ottoman Greeks of a "general massacre of the Moslem population" and charged the Armenian Republic at Yerevan with carrying out a "policy of extermination" against that region's Muslims. On September 11 the Sivas*

meeting declared that no Armenian or Greek sovereignty would be countenanced in the territory of Turkey.

Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 276.

37 That so many concluded otherwise bothered George Horton greatly at the time, and was a major reason he wrote his book, *Blight of Asia*. In it he said: *Much has been said of atrocities and massacres committed by the Greek troops at the time of their landing at Smyrna on May 15, 1919. In fact, the events that occurred on that and the few succeeding days have been magnified until they have taken on larger proportions in the public mind than the deliberate extermination of whole nations by the Turks, and no consideration seems to have been given to the prompt suppression of the disorders by the Greek authorities and the summary punishment of the principal offenders, several of them by death.*

Blight of Asia, Chapter 10.

38 Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: see for example, pages 401, and 483.

39 Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 441.

40 We should also recognize the role of Turkish propaganda. It is true that the occupation of Smyrna shocked the Turkish public into realizing the Allies were serious about partitioning Anatolia—something almost all Turks wanted to avoid at all costs. But it is also true that the Turks proved adept at twisting the event into a propaganda coup and grossly exaggerating Greek atrocities. Morris and Ze'evi have quite a bit to say about Turkish propaganda and duplicity, used to good effect to disguise their objectives and whip up Turkish popular support, in part by accusing their victims of what they intended to do themselves. In September of 1919, at a nationalist gathering in Sivas, Mustapha Kemal:

*advanced the narrative at the heart of the Nationalist struggle: "The non-Moslem elements with which we have led a joint existence ab antique, encouraged by the favor shown them by the Entente Powers, broke into open attacks on the dignity and rights of the Nation and State." He accused the Greek army and Ottoman Greeks of a "general massacre of the Moslem population" and charged the Armenian Republic at Yerevan with carrying out a "policy of extermination" against that region's Muslims. On September 11 the Sivas meeting declared that no Armenian or Greek sovereignty would be countenanced in the territory of Turkey. (Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 276)*

In short, Nationalist leaders convinced Turkish popular opinion, and even some international observers, that the violence they themselves had orchestrated, which led to the death of hundreds, was a general, ongoing attempt by the Greeks to exterminate all Muslims.

This perception of the Greek occupation of Smyrna astounded Horton, and was a major reason he wrote his book, *Blight of Asia*. In it he said:

*Much has been said of atrocities and massacres committed by the Greek troops at the time of their landing at Smyrna on May 15, 1919. In fact, the events that occurred on that and the few succeeding days have been magnified until they have taken on larger proportions in the public mind than the deliberate extermination of whole nations by the Turks, and no consideration seems to have been given to the prompt suppression of the disorders by the Greek authorities and the summary punishment of the principal offenders, several of them by death. (*Blight of Asia*, Chapter 10).*

Although Horton had opposed the occupation as unwise, he also observed that in practice the Greek administration was comparatively successful and peaceful for all ethnic groups. This is yet another point where modern scholars have substantiated Horton's views. Morris and Ze'evi, for example, note that Greek rule was comparatively benign, and that even Turks often preferred it to living under the Turkish Nationalists. They also acknowledge that the Greek occupation could not be the stimulus for persecution of Christian minorities because, as they said, "Turks, after all, had been massacring, raping, and, plundering Christians for decades." The quote is from p. 441; for the assertion that the Greek occupation was relatively benign, see Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*, 401 and 483.

41 As Morris and Ze'evi argue, and George Horton argued many decades earlier, the ethnic cleansing of Christian minorities had been a consistent Turkish policy for decades. Just as importantly, the persecution did not end with the termination of hostilities in WWI or with the eviction of Greek forces from Smyrna in 1922. On the contrary, as George Horton predicted and Morris and Ze'evi document, as soon as Turkish forces retook Smyrna, the Turks reinstated the 1915 deportation and confiscation laws that authorized deportation of "persons judged to be a threat to national security" and confiscation of their property, both of which had been rescinded under pressure from the victorious Allies after WWI ended. Regardless of which Allied forces occupied Smyrna, or whether any did, there was going to be Turkish resistance and Turkish persecution of Christians. Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 265.

42The Allied leadership dealt with this dilemma by establishing their goals as matters of principle irrespective of whether they were willing and able to summon the means to achieve them—perhaps hoping to bluff the Turks into acquiescence. The Turks called their bluff, and as history demonstrates, the Allies were not willing to sustain the costs of achieving their high-minded objectives. Again, in contrast, the Turks were ruthless and realistic in assessing what it would take to achieve their objectives. The Nationalist pact of 1920, effectively the movement’s constitution, announced “we shall establish the borders [of the Turkish Republic] according to the degree of our power and our strength.” Morris and Ze’evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 274; 288.

43“The Christians in the power of the Turk have never had much opportunity to massacre, even had they been so disposed. If a few Turks have been killed in the long history of butcheries that have soaked the empire with blood, the reckoning, mathematically, will not be 50-50, nor even one to ten thousand.” *Blight of Asia*, Chapter 36.

44Morris and Ze’evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 475

45Morris and Ze’evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 401.

46Morris and Ze’evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 475-484.

47Morris and Ze’evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 475.

48Here is the quote in full:*The veracity of these assorted accusations is questionable. Routinely, the Turks threw out general charges, such as a Greek "preconceived plan" to exterminate "the Turkish element." But when the Turks gave specifics...they were almost never confirmed by Western diplomats, missionaries, or journalists. Western diplomats came to believe that most Turkish charges were fraudulent, invented to offset Western accusations of Turkish atrocities.*

Morris and Ze’evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 476-477.

49Morris and Ze’evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 330.

50The full quotation follows:*The letter speaks generally of "misdeeds, the likes of which do not exist in the annals of history" and then gives details: "A Greek officer, two sergeants, two interpreters and a secretary have occupied the building of the Mussulman Community of Eskidje." Or "a society has been formed with the pretext of finding clothing for poor children. This society obliges the Moslems to give a minimum sum of 10 drachmas per person. [An] officer's wife, accompanied by two soldiers, penetrates into houses and herself gathers this tax." Most of the alleged offences listed were similarly trivial. The complaint also alleged beatings of Turkish peasants, sometimes resulting in individual deaths, and occasional rapes. There is no mention of organized massacres or mass rape or mass torture.*

Morris and Ze’evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 482-483.

51Morris and Ze’evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 414-416, 420, 424, 428, 443.

52With the Nazis, they note, “in most cases the process was impersonal and cold, and geared only to extermination.” By contrast:*The Turks' mass murder and deportation of the Christians during 1894-1924, on the other hand, was highly upfront and personal and involved countless acts of individual sadism. Where the Nazis used guns and gas, many of the murdered Christians were killed with knives, bayonets, axes, and stones; thousands were burned alive (the Nazis burned corpses); tens of thousands of women and girls were gang-raped and murdered; clerics were crucified; and thousands of Christian dignitaries were tortured—eyes gouged out, noses and ears cut off, feet turned to mush—before being executed. In terms of the behavior of the perpetrators, on the level of individual actions, the Turkish massacre of the Christians was far more sadistic than the Nazi murder of the Jews.*

Morris and Ze’evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 501.

53For example:*During summer 1920 Turkish gendarmes and village headmen in the Aegean region reported cases of abuse, murder, and rape by conquering Greek soldiers. But British officials found no evidence of this. In Thrace, they reported, the Greek troops' "behaviour ... was exemplary." In Asia Minor there were "occasional cases of misconduct," but the Greek authorities punished the miscreants.*

Morris and Ze’evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 400, 483.

54For the quote, see Morris and Ze’evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 483.

55One such example, is Osman Aga, the infamous Turkish irregular who reveled in pillaging. Here is the full quote from Morris and Ze’evi on this issue:*The most murderous Turks received the greatest rewards. In October Osman Aga went to Ankara for a meeting with Kemal; he left with a new job, as governor general of the coastal area from Inebolu to Hoppa. Kemal and Osman may not have had precisely the same priorities—*

the Nationalists were driven by political fervor and religious hatred, and Osman primarily by the desire to pillage. But Kemal knew how to get the worst out of his subordinates.

Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 404.

56For examples of righteous Turks, see for example, pages 269, 406, 409 in Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*. For an example of punishing those Turks wanting to help, see 238, 406-407.

57George Horton was frustrated by the inability of Allied governments to grasp this fact; particularly his own. There was a huge gap in understanding between those on the scene during the burning of Smyrna, and those sitting in Constantinople or Washington, D.C. For an excellent but under-appreciated account of the burning of Smyrna that uses U.S. citizen and sailor accounts to good effect, see "Chapter 10, The Burning of Smyrna," in Robert Shenk, *America's Black Sea Fleet: The U.S. Navy Amidst War and Revolution 1919-1923*. Naval Institute Press, 2017. Shenk's next two chapters on what followed Smyrna are poignant and well worth reading as well.

58Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 3.

59Horton has been described as 1) "prejudiced," 2) a fanatic phil-Hellenist who 3) "tended to be anti-Turkish," as guilty of 4) "anti-Turkish rhetoric" and 5) "demonization of Muslims, in general, and of Turks, in particular." His book, *The Blight of Asia*, published in 1926, has been called 6) "a study in the victory of prejudice over reason." See, respectively: 1) Corinna Tsakiridou, "Ideology, Prejudice and Ethnic Conflict in George Horton's *The Blight of Asia*: A Radical Narrative Reconsidered." *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 25:1 (Spring 2001), pp. 21-38. Tsakiridou clarifies the kind of prejudice she means: "there is no doubt, as we shall see below, that *The Blight of Asia* is a prejudiced work. However, its prejudice is not idiosyncratic. It is symptomatic of an ideological orientation toward the Ottoman world and its people's (Christian and Muslim) that has its origins in the Crusades and the Renaissance and that represents the West as a superior, corrective and redeeming civilization." 2) Buzanski, "Admiral Bristol and Turkish-American Relations, 1919-1922," 176. Buzanski further revealed his lack of familiarity with George Horton by claiming that, "During the Turkish capture of Smyrna, at the end of the Greco Turkish war, Horton suffered a breakdown, resign from the diplomatic service, and spent the balance of his life writing anti-Turkish, pro-Greek books." (Buzanski, 176). None of this is true. George Horton did not suffer a breakdown at the end of the Greco-Turkish war, nor did he resign after the burning of Smyrna, nor did he spend the rest of his life writing anti-Turkish and pro-Greek books. 3) On a roll, Louis P. Cassimatis adds "anti-American Indian, and anti-Negro" to his list of charges against George Horton. These preposterous claims by Cassimatis are completely false as my biography will demonstrate. Cassimatis offers no evidence or even a reference for his accusations, so why he advanced them is a mystery. He was contrasting Horton with Admiral Bristol, who he described as anti-Greek and pro-Turkish, so perhaps he thought casting aspersions on George Horton would make him appear balanced. Louis P. Cassimatis, *American Influence in Greece, 1917-1929*. Ashland: Kent State University Press, 2012: 254, 254, fn 8. 4) David Roessel, *In Byron's Shadow: Modern Greece in the English and American Imagination: Modern Greece in the English and American Imagination*. Oxford University Press, 2001: 327-8. 5) Brian Coleman, "George Horton: The Literary Diplomat," *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, Volume 30, Number 1, January 2006: 81-93. 6) Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922*. Darwin Press: Princeton, NJ, 1995: 316.

60When accused of anti-Turkish bigotry, George responded that he was: *neither "pro-Greek," "pro-Turk," nor anything except pro-American and pro-Christ. Having passed the most of my life in regions where race feeling runs high, it has been my one aim to help the oppressed, irrespective of race, as will be shown by documents submitted later, and I have won the expressed gratitude of numerous Turks for the aid and relief I have afforded them on various occasions. I am aware of the many noble qualities of the Turkish peasant, but I do not agree with many precepts of his religion, and I do not admire him when he is cutting throats or violating Christian women.*

Blight of Asia, Chapter 3.

61As I've noted elsewhere, polling in Muslim countries indicates that the more homogenously Muslim a country is, the more its populace support intolerant laws aimed at minorities. So, if one believes tolerant attitudes are uplifting, George was right about Turkey benefiting from ethnic and religious diversity. See Ismini A. Lamb, "The Gates of Greece: Refugees and Policy Choices," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 27:2, 2016: 67-88.

62See the argument by Vahakn N. Dadrian, in "Documentation of the Armenian Genocide," in Charny, Israel W. *Genocide: A Critical Bibliographic Review. Vol. 3, the Widening Circle of Genocide*. New Brunswick, U.S.A.: Transaction Publishers, 1994: 83-85.