CYPRUS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY:
A GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS

At a time of accelerating momentum toward European unity, the continuing division of Cyprus stands out as a tragic exception. The 1974 Turkish invasion and subsequent partial occupation of Cyprus have now endured for over 26 years. The costs in terms of human suffering, regional instability and damage to the vital American interest in East Mediterranean stability are significant.

In the United States and international community, there is widespread agreement that the status quo is unacceptable. In his visit to Greece and Turkey in November 1999, President Clinton highlighted the need for accelerated efforts to reach a settlement. Other U.S. officials have described the Cyprus problem as an "outrage" and have acknowledged U.S. moral responsibility for it. The U.S. Congress has called for a high priority to be given to Cyprus. The United Nations, European Union and the G8 have made similar calls. U.S. officials have undertaken multiple visits to the region. The United Nations is pursuing a renewed initiative based on 'proximity' talks and a new set of Security Council resolutions passed in December 1999. The G8 statement at its July 2000 G8 meeting in Japan endorsed this initiative. Greece has stated that progress on Cyprus is essential for the continued well-being of its new, warmer relations with Turkey.

As new rounds of 'proximity' talks continue in 2000, decisions of the European Union have lent a new urgency to the peace process. At its December 10-11, 1999 Council in Helsinki to reaffirm its readiness to accept Cyprus, which opened accession negotiations with the EU in March 1998, as a member state without a prior settlement of the Cyprus problem. At the same meeting, the EU made it a requirement for commencing future accession negotiations with Turkey that Turkey should make good faith efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem. Turkey accepted this requirement but to date has shown little change in its pattern of intransigence.

With key U.S. political, security, and economic interests at stake in the region, the benefits of a settlement would be considerable. A long-running source of regional tension would be removed, thus enhancing overall regional stability. A settlement might pave the way for a wider Greek-Turkish rapprochement. In Cyprus itself the benefits would also be significant, most notably in terms of political, economic, and social advances for all communities on the island.

As with all long-running international disputes, the Cyprus problem has a detailed history and a specialized vocabulary. This guide sets out the most recent developments, including the U.S. role, and assesses prospects for progress. It also provides historical background, including the major components of previous initiatives.

The guide concludes with a statement of the American Hellenic Institute's position on a realistic approach to the Cyprus problem.

July, 2000

Part 1: Guide to the Current Issues

The fundamental choice facing the international community over the Cyprus problem is clear-cut. Will the final resolution be one in which Cyprus remains a unified state in accordance with democratic norms, international law and Security Council resolutions or will the present illegal state of de facto partition, occupation, and dismemberment be allowed to stand?

The stakes for U.S. national interests are high. With key U.S. political, security, and economic interests at stake in the region, the benefits of a settlement would be considerable. A long-running source of regional tension would be removed, thus enhancing overall regional stability. A settlement might pave the way for a wider Greek-Turkish rapprochement. In Cyprus itself the benefits would also be significant, most notably in terms of economic and social advances for the Turkish Cypriot community.

As with all long-running international disputes, the Cyprus problem has a detailed history and a specialized vocabulary. These include: the breakdown of intercommunal relations; regional power politics; Cold War rivalries; foreign aggression and interference; the 1974 Turkish invasion; the continuing Turkish occupation; forced population displacement; human rights violations; disregard for the rule of law. This guide (which updates the March 1999 edition) contains an overview of the main issues, including the current situation, key historical background and the positions of the various parties. A glossary of the main technical terms (highlighted in bold type) is also provided.

The Current Situation

In 1999 the deep-felt sense in the international community that continued failure to achieve a settlement of the Cyprus problem was no longer tolerable led to the launching of a new initiative. Meeting in Cologne, Germany on June 20, 1999 the G8 industrial nations issued a statement stating that "the Cyprus problem has gone unresolved for too long and its resolution would not only benefit all the people of Cyprus, but would also have a positive impact on peace and stability in the region." The G8 invited the UN Secretary-General to convene the parties to begin a "process of substantive negotiations, without preconditions and in a spirit of conciliation and cooperation." At its meeting in Okinawa, Japan from July 21-23, 2000 the G8 deplored the continuing division of Cyprus and reiterated its support for this initiative.

Following the G8 lead in 1999, the UN Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1250 (1999) adopted on June 28, 1999. This called for negotiations on the basis of the following principles:

1. No preconditions.
2. All issues on the table.
3. Commitment in good faith to continue to negotiate until a settlement is reached.
4. Full consideration of relevant United Nations resolutions and treaties.

At the same time, the Security Council reiterated its position on the framework for a settlement in its resolution 1251 (1999). This stated that "a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded and comprising two politically equal communities as described in the relevant Security Council resolutions, in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or part with any other country or any form of partition or secession."

The negotiations resulting from these resolutions initially took the form of 'proximity' talks held under the auspices of the UN led by the Secretary-General's representative Mr. Alvaro de Soto. The talks have been attended by President Clerides of Cyprus and the Mr. Rauf Denktash, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community. No direct talks between the two leaders have yet taken place. Sessions have been held in New York and Geneva. Discussion is focusing on four core issues: distribution of powers, security, property, and territory. The purpose of the 'proximity' discussions is to establish a clear basis of understanding about the parties' positions before moving to direct negotiations designed to reach a settlement.

In parallel but unconnected talks, the Cyprus government is conducting accession negotiations with the European Union (EU). These negotiations, which began in 1998, are expected to lead to Cyprus' EU accession in the next round of EU enlargement. At present the Turkish Cypriot community has declined the Cyprus government's invitation to participate in the negotiations but all benefits from Cyprus' EU accession will accrue to the Turkish Cypriot community once a settlement has been achieved.

The Issues under Discussion: The Key Principles

The broad framework of a settlement may be found both in documents agreed between the two Cypriot communities (for example, the 1977 and 1979 High Level Agreements) and in documents adopted by the international community (for example, SCR 939 (1994) of July 29, 1994). These include:

• A State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty, international personality, and a single citizenship.
• A central federal government with adequate powers and functions to safeguard the unity of the country.
• A territorial apportionment based on economic viability and land ownership.
• Safeguards for independence and territorial integrity.
• Respect for human rights.
• The demilitarization of Cyprus.
• Two politically equal communities, as defined in the relevant Security Council resolutions.
• A bicommunal and bizonal federation.
• The exclusion of any union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession.

In addition to these principles, certain specific constitutional provisions have been put forward. These include:

• The President and Vice-President to come from different communities.
• The Lower House to be divided 70-30 between the communities.
• The Upper House to have numerically equal representation from the two communities.
• Local administration of territory to be apportioned approximately 75%-25% between the communities.

The Positions of the Parties

The Cyprus Government

The Cyprus government is committed to a settlement based on the framework established by successive UN Security Council resolutions providing for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with a single international personality and with both communities enjoying political equality.

As a first step toward practical implementation of these principles, the Republic of Cyprus government has recognized that security is the key concern for all Cypriots. It has therefore proposed the total demilitarization of Cyprus, with security being provided by a Multinational Force under international command (to which both Greece and Turkey might contribute units) mandated to guarantee a constitutional settlement. It has further proposed that the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee be modernized.

The Turkish Cypriot Community

The central component of Mr. Denktash's negotiating position emerged following meetings with the Cyprus government in February 1975. This was a demand for a solution based on a "bicommunal and biregional federal state." This concept was designed to allow each community to exercise administrative control over a territorially defined area. This concept was contained in the Makarios-Denktash High-Level Agreement of February 1977 and the 10 Point High Level Agreement of May 1979.

Since that time, Mr. Denktash's position has vacillated. He has expanded his the concept of federalism to insist above all else on recognition of the occupied areas as a separate sovereign entity as a pre-condition for settlement negotiations and to demand the withdrawal of Cyprus' application to the EU. The former demand is at odds with Security Council resolutions and other determinations that Cyprus must remain a unitary state with a single sovereignty and that settlement talks must take place on an intercommunal basis. On April 21, 2000 Presidential Emissary Al Moses repeated the long-held U.S. position that these new pre-conditions are "non-starters."

Although Mr. Denktash is generally recognized as the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, opinion there is not monolithic. Other parties including the Republican Turkish Party (RTP) led by Mr. Mehmet Ali Talat, and the Patriotic Union Movement (PUM) led by Mr. Izzet Izcan have criticized Mr. Denktash for inflexibility. In 2000 large demonstrations took place in the occupied areas on behalf of "Peace Now." On July 11, 2000 Mr. Sener Levent, editor-in-chief of the Turkish Cypriot newspaper AVRUPA, stated: "We are fighting for a single Republic of Cyprus. To be honest, we are being held prisoner in our own homeland. Whatever Ankara and its commanders want, they get."

The United States

The underlying position of the United States, as articulated by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on May 12, 2000 is that "Cyprus has been divided for far too long. The status quo is unacceptable." This sense of frustration is shared by the U.S. Congress. On July 18, 2000 Chairman Ben Gilman of the House International Relations Committee stated: "It is one of the most frustrating facts that I have faced as I look back on that now, after a quarter of a century during which we have seen the collapse of communism in Europe, greater peace in the Middle East, a possible settlement in Northern Ireland, and conflicts resolved in the Balkan tinderbox, but no movement on Cyprus."

This approach reflects a strong U.S. national interest in the region. On February 2, 2000 Under-Secretary for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering stated that "a durable peace in the Aegean and in Cyprus, based on respect for international law and safeguarding democratic rights, will be a powerful force for regional stability and development." In January 1997 then National Security Adviser Anthony Lake said that the continuing stalemate in Cyprus was one of the world's top "outrages."

Other than the American-British-Canadian (ABC) comprehensive plan of 1978, general U.S. policy has been generally to give close and active support to UN mediation efforts by means of Special Presidential Emissaries and Special Cyprus Coordinators. The present incumbents are Ambassador Al Moses and Ambassador Thomas Weston respectively. A consistent theme of all Administrations from President Carter until the present day is that the U.S. should seek to ensure the independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of Cyprus. (Brief excerpts from presidential statements may be found in the glossary.)

The U.S. Congress has consistently favored a more direct U.S. involvement. In response to the 1974 Turkish invasion, Congress rejected the policy of then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who tilted for the aggressor (Turkey) and against the victim (the Republic of Cyprus). He refused to apply the provisions of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act mandating the immediate halt in U.S. aid to an instigator of aggression. Against the administration's wishes, it passed a rule of law amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act in December, 1974. This placed an arms embargo on Turkey, effective February 5, 1975, that lasted until August, 1978.

The Congress has continued to be actively concerned about Cyprus. In September 1995 the House of Representatives passed a Concurrent Resolution (H.Con.Res.42) calling for speedy progress toward a just and peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem and endorsing the concept of demilitarization for Cyprus. On June 30, 2000 a letter co-signed by 232 Representatives and 81 Senators urged President Clinton to "give his utmost attention" to the Cyprus 'proximity' talks. In July 2000, H.Con.Res.370 was introduced in the House of Representatives calling for the "Government of Turkey to withdraw its armed forces from the island of Cyprus and to negotiate for the reunification of the Republic of Cyprus on the basis of existing UN Security Council Resolutions."

Greece

As a party to the 1960 Treaties establishing the Republic of Cyprus and as a result of its defense agreement with Cyprus, Greece is committed to a resolution of the Cyprus problem and to the defense of Cyprus. Successive Greek governments have reaffirmed that an attack on Cyprus would represent an attack on Greece. On July 20, 2000 Prime Minister Simitis stated: "The Cyprus issue is always the focal point of our attention and activity. We have repeatedly stated on every opportunity, at all the international organizations and international fora, and in our bilateral contacts with the neighboring country, that the full normalization of Greek-Turkish relations passes through the settlement of an overall, just, permanent, viable and workable solution to the problem of Cyprus."

These ties aside, however, Greece is not a direct party to the Cyprus problem other than as one of the guarantor powers and as a member of the EU and NATO. Greece fully accepts Cyprus' separate international identity. As such, Cyprus is not a bilateral problem between Greece and Turkey but a problem of invasion and occupation of a sovereign member of the UN. There is no linkage between Cyprus and Greece's other unresolved issues with Turkey and it is inappropriate to address these issues as a "package." It is safe to say, however, that a settlement of the Cyprus problem would greatly improve the climate in Greek-Turkish relations.

Turkey

Turkey's position is that its intervention in 1974 and subsequent occupation are legitimate actions under the Treaty of Guarantee. On many occasions Turkish officials have asserted that Turkey's invasion "solved" the Cyprus problem. Turkey thus favors a solution based on two independent and sovereign entities on Cyprus. It has inspired and encouraged Turkish Cypriot intransigence on that demand. Turkey is the only state to recognize the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." Turkey has consistently rejected and failed to cooperate with international efforts to mediate the Cyprus problem. For example, on July 17, 2000 Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit stated that "EU interventions complicate the Cyprus problem and the disputes between Turkey and Greece." Turkey has also reacted negatively to the 2000 and 1999 G8 initiative.

Following the European Union's decision at its December 1999 Helsinki council to accept Turkey as a candidate member (see below), new expectations have been raised about Turkey's interest in reaching a settlement. On January 20, 2000 Prime Minister Ecevit stated that the Cyprus problem could be solved "through dialogue." On July 14, 2000 Turkish Foreign Minister Ismael Cem stated that the time had come for "action not gestures." At the same time Turkish violations of Cypriot air space, illegal troop movements in the UN buffer zone, and Turkish support for a separate sovereignty on Cyprus have continued.

The European Union: Catalyst for a Solution Leading to Regional Stability

Although not a formal party to the Cyprus problem, the European Union is de facto exercising an increasingly influence over the search for a solution. Its role follows two tracks:

1. It is conducting negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus for the latter's accession to the EU. It is doing this in the expectation that EU accession will accelerate a settlement, but, as stated at the 1999 Helsinki Council, it is prepared to admit Cyprus without a "political settlement being a precondition."
2. It has required Turkey to make genuine efforts to reach a settlement as a pre-condition of Turkey's EU accession.

EU Negotiations with Cyprus

Accession negotiations between the EU and Cyprus opened on March 31, 1998, with the substantive phase of the negotiations beginning on November 10, 1998. Solid progress has achieved since that time. On March 25, 2000 EU Enlargement Commission Verheugen described Cyprus as "the frontrunner in the accession talks with the EU." President Clerides has reaffirmed that representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community are welcome to participate in these negotiations as members of a unitary delegation of the Republic of Cyprus. On November 10, 1998 he stated: "The road toward accession offers us new possibilities and avenues for cooperation between the two communities of Cyprus. It is our earnest desire that our Turkish Cypriot compatriots share the task of preparing Cyprus for EU membership."

Prior to the opening of formal negotiations, Cyprus already had a long association with the EU beginning in 1972 when it entered into an association agreement with then European Economic Community. In 1987 Cyprus signed a Customs Union protocol. It applied for full membership in 1990. Given the 1993 opinion by the European Commission that Cyprus meets the criteria for EU membership (including the Maastricht criteria for European Monetary Union), these negotiations are likely to lead to Cyprus's accession. On January 1, 1999 the Cyprus Central Bank announced that the Cyprus pound would be pegged to the Euro. On January 24, 2000 EU Enlargement Commission Guenther Verheugen stated that "Cyprus' process of accession to the European Union will continue unhindered irrespective of a solution to its political problem."

EU legal counsel have confirmed that the Treaty of Guarantee does not constitute a legal barrier to Cyprus's accession. The U.S. welcomed the opening of Cyprus' negotiations with the EU. On May 5, 2000 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated: "we have strongly supported the EU's decision to start accession talks with Cyprus."

EU expansion is expected to act as a catalyst for regional political and economic advance, including for Cyprus. On December 10, 1999 EU Commissioner Verheugen said, "The acceptance of Cyprus' candidacy had from the beginning corresponded to the hope that the accession negotiations could contribute positively to a solution of the conflict between the two communities." Given that Cyprus will accede to the EU as a single state, it is greatly to be preferred that the Cyprus problem is solved so that the whole of Cyprus can enjoy the undisputed political, security, social and economic benefits accruing from EU membership. In the event that no settlement is forthcoming, however, the tangible benefits of EU membership will not extend to the area under illegal Turkish occupation, so long as that occupation continues, thus retarding political integration and economic development in this area.

The EU Helsinki Council

At its December 11-12, 1999 Council meeting in Helsinki, the European Union reached two important decisions bearing on the Cyprus problem:

1. EU accession talks with Cyprus will continue and that Cyprus' accession will not be contingent on a settlement of the Cyprus problem;
2. EU will open accession negotiations with a number of applicant countries, including Turkey. Before opening such talks with Turkey, however, the EU established a pre-condition that a Cyprus settlement be reached.

The effect of these decisions is to make the search for a Cyprus settlement an integral part of EU policy.

The Benefits of EU Membership for All Cypriots

The benefits of a settlement would be significant, especially for the Turkish Cypriot community who at present are out of the international mainstream. By facilitating island-wide development and by allowing the occupied areas to participate in the global economy, the Turkish Cypriot community, whose present per capita income is only a quarter of that of the Greek Cypriots, would be among the principal beneficiaries of a settlement. Opinion polls conducted by the Cyprus Public Opinion and Market Research Company (COMAR) have regularly shown that an overwhelming majority (89.6%) of Turkish Cypriots favor joining the EU in the expectation that this will confer tangible benefits in such areas as education, employment, health, security and in allowing Turkish Cypriots to close the economic gap with Greek Cypriots.

The regional benefits would extend far beyond the economic sphere. A settlement in Cyprus would remove a malignant source of regional instability. It might pave the way for a wider agreement between Greece and Turkey. Turkey would be freed of the annual financial costs of subsidizing the occupied areas to the amount of about $500 million. It would also benefit from the prospect of a less troubled relationship with the EU, the UN, and other international organizations. The resultant strengthening of regional stability would significantly enhance U.S. interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Part 2: Background to the Problem

Cyprus is the third largest Mediterranean island with an area of 3,572 square miles (somewhat smaller than Connecticut.) Cyprus dates back its history for 8,000 years. Its origins and culture are Greek. From 1571-1878 it was part of the Ottoman Empire. From 1878 to 1960 it was under British rule. Its population is 736,636 of which 81% is Greek Cypriot and 18% Turkish Cypriot, with the balance comprising Armenians and Maronites.

Following talks between Britain, Greece, and Turkey culminating in the Zürich and London Agreements, Cyprus gained independence from Britain in 1960 as an independent, sovereign, and unitary state. Its legal name is the Republic of Cyprus. The 1960 constitution provided for strict power-sharing between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, with the latter (an 18% minority population) having veto powers over all major legislation and being entitled to a disproportionate share in ministerial, parliamentary, civil service, army and police posts.

This constitution rapidly proved unworkable. In 1963 first the Turkish Government in Ankara and later the Turkish Cypriot leadership rejected offers of constitutional amendments proposed by Cyprus President Makarios to overcome the constitutional deadlock. Prompted by Turkey, the Turkish Cypriot ministers and other officials withdrew from the government. At the same time the Turkish military contingent on Cyprus unilaterally took up positions to the north of Cyprus's capital Nicosia. The security situation on the island deteriorated into intercommunal violence, fanned by ultra nationalist elements on both sides. British and UN sponsored mediation efforts failed to restore order. In the face of an explicit threat of invasion from Turkey and escalating internal unrest, the UN established a peace-keeping force (UNFICYP) in Cyprus in March 1964.

In the immediately following years, attitudes on all sides hardened. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership intensified their efforts aimed at achieving a permanent partition (taksim) of the island. In Greece and Cyprus ultra nationalists renewed demands for union (enosis) with Greece. During this period, the position of the international community crystallized around a set of broad principles (excluding partition and union) that have remained constant to this day, namely that:

• Cyprus should remain a unified state.
• Cyprus should enjoy full sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence.
• There should be no foreign intervention or interference.
• Normal intercommunal relations should be restored.

In June 1964, President Lyndon Johnson sent a written warning to the Turkish government not to take military action over Cyprus. Johnson's letter explicitly ruled out a settlement of the Cyprus problem based on partition. In November 1967, the U.S. again took action to prevent a threatened Turkish invasion of Cyprus (for which the Turkish military had mobilized.)

Despite continuing intercommunal tensions, the search for reconciliation did not cease. From 1968-74 Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives held a series of UN-sponsored talks seeking a framework for a normalization of relations between the two communities. Some progress was made, including in 1968 an explicit renunciation of enosis by President Makarios. During this period tensions were lessened and there were no incidents of intercommunal violence.

In 1974 this conciliatory trend was shattered first by the July 15, 1974 coup against President Makarios engineered by the Greek junta and ultra nationalist elements in Cyprus and then five days later by the illegal Turkish invasion. In the course of this invasion (and in follow-on aggression in August in defiance of UN cease-fire agreements), Turkish forces occupied some 37% of the territory of Cyprus, leading to large scale refugee flight, ethnic partitioning, and property destruction. This situation endures to this day. Over 35,000 Turkish troops remain on Cyprus.

The Search for a Settlement(Early Events

In response to the Turkish invasion, the international community engaged itself actively in the search for a settlement, with the UN providing the main forum in the form of the Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices. The focus of these efforts, whether in the form of bilateral talks, proximity talks, through the mediation of Special Representatives, or proposals for confidence-building measures, has been to promote a just and lasting solution to the problem based on the following objectives:

• To secure the removal of all foreign forces from the island.
• To bring about the return of refugees.
• To restore the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Cyprus.
• To agree on new constitutional arrangements respecting the human rights of all the people of Cyprus.

Language to this effect may be found in successive UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, including GA 3212 (1974) of November 1, 1974, SCR 365 (1974) of December 13, 1974, SCR 939 (1994) of July 29, 1994, and (most recently) 1218 (1998). The first of these was passed unanimously, including a positive vote from Turkey.

Progress toward achieving these goals has been minimal. Significant policy reviews by the Greek Cypriot community to address the concerns of the Turkish Cypriot side, for example, the 1977 and 1979 High Level Agreements introducing the concepts of a bicommunal and bizonal federation, have not been reciprocated.

Instead, some serious backward steps have been taken. In 1975 the Turkish military authorities announced the establishment of the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus." Despite condemnation from the Security Council and other bodies such as the Council of Europe, Turkish efforts to establish a separatist state in the area under their control persisted, with Greek Cypriots being expelled from their homes and settlers from Turkey being imported, once again in defiance of international law and UN resolutions.

In 1983, the Turkish Cypriot leadership unilaterally declared the establishment of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." This declaration, which the international community viewed as an attempt to dismember Cyprus, was condemned as illegal and invalid by SCR 541 (1983) of November 18, 1983. SCR 550 (1984) of May 11, 1984, called upon all states to refrain from recognizing the "TRNC" and from assisting or facilitating it in any way. Today, only Turkey recognizes the secessionist entity.

Developments in 1997-1999

Negotiations under UN Auspices

From July-November 1997 a series of meetings took place between President Clerides and Mr. Denktash. From July 9-13 and August 11-16 respectively, they held a series of meetings under UN auspices in Troutbec, New York, and Montreux, Switzerland. In July and September they held informal meetings in Nicosia to discuss humanitarian and security issues. In November they met again at the invitation of Mr. Holbrooke in Nicosia. The UN-sponsored talks were not productive. On each occasion, Mr. Denktash refused to accept for discussion consultative documents offered by the UN mediator, Mr. Diego Cordovez.

Following the impasse at the Swiss talks, the President of the Security Council, Sir John Weston, faulted the Turkish side for "impeding substantive progress." By contrast, the Security Council noted that President Clerides had been "flexible and cooperative." Speaking at a Capitol Hill Conference on June 10, 1998 Senator Gordon Smith (R-OR), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European Affairs stated that "President Clerides is open, offering a multiplicity of solutions, willing to cooperate. I did not find the same openness from Mr. Denktash, but I found demands that frankly made negotiations very difficult to start."

On September 30, 1998, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan launched a new "Good Offices" mission under the leadership of his then special representative Dame Ann Hercus. She has conducted multiple exploratory meetings in Cyprus and the region. In its resolutions 1217 (1998) and 1218 (1998) of December 22, 1998, the UN Security Council endorsed this initiative and requested the Secretary-General to work towards achieving "substantial progress on the core aspects of a comprehensive Cyprus settlement." Resolution 1218 emphasized the following measures:

1. An undertaking to refrain from the threat or use of force or violence as a means to resolve the Cyprus problem;
2. A staged process aimed at limiting and then substantially reducing the level of all troops and armaments on Cyprus;
3. Implementation of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) package of measures aimed at reducing tensions along the cease-fire lines, and a commitment to enter into discussions with UNFICYP with a view to early agreement on further specific and related tension-reducing steps, including demining along the buffer zone;
4. Further progress in the area of tension-reduction;
5. Efforts to achieve substantive progress on the core aspects of a comprehensive Cyprus settlement;
6. Other measures that will build trust and cooperation between the two sides.

The Cyprus Government welcomed the UN initiative and Security Council resolutions. Foreign Minister Yiannakis Cassoulides stated on December 24, 1998 that "the Cyprus government considers these two resolutions positively because we believe they create some hopeful prospects regarding efforts to open a road on the core issues of the Cyprus problem, but mainly for the reduction of all armaments with an aim to the demilitarization of the island." Both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots took the opposite approach, issuing highly negative statements. Mr. Denktash restated that he would not participate in peace talks until his regime is recognized as a sovereign entity.

Developments in Greek-Turkish relations were also relevant. Following a meeting in Madrid convened by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on 8 July, 1997, Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis and Turkish President Suleyman Demirel released a communiqué known as the Madrid Agreement. Among the Agreement's provisions were respect for the principles of international law and international agreements and a commitment to settle disputes by peaceful means based on mutual consent and without the use of force or threat of force.

Although the Agreement did not mention Cyprus by name, it gave rise to hope of Turkish adherence to international law as framed in successive Security Council resolutions. The meeting between the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers at the November 3-4, 1997 Summit of Southeast European States renewed these hopes. Despite repeated meetings between Greek and Turkish ministers at various fora (for example, the Balkan Defense Ministers meeting in Athens on January 12, 1999), these hopes went unfulfilled. Both the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey continued to take actions that violated the international consensus founded on the rule of law and the status of Cyprus as a unitary state.

The Role of the Clinton Administration

In both its first and second terms, the Clinton Administration gave a high rhetorical priority to the Cyprus problem. Its concrete achievements, especially with regard to tackling the source of the problem in the Turkish military, were less satisfactory.

As a presidential candidate in 1992 then Governor Clinton stated that the Cyprus problem should be resolved in accordance with the "fundamental principles of human rights and democratic norms and practices." In 1996, recognizing that Cyprus' impending EU accession offered an opportunity for a positive U.S. engagement, then Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke announced a new initiative on Cyprus. The effective launch of this initiative was delayed in the face of renewed (and legally baseless) Turkish territorial claims in the Aegean and political uncertainty in Turkey.

During the 1996 presidential election campaign President Clinton declared that resolution of the Cyprus problem would be a "high priority" for his second term. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has said that Cyprus constitutes both a moral obligation for the U.S. as well as an important U.S. security interest.

In June 1997, the Administration appointed Mr. Holbrooke as Special Presidential Emissary and Ambassador Thomas Miller as State Department Coordinator for Cyprus. Both undertook multiple visits to the region. In 1999 they were succeeded by Ambassador Al Moses and Ambassador Thomas Weston respectively.

These initiatives reflected the widespread agreement in the United States throughout this period that the status quo was unacceptable. On June 10, 1998 Chairman Ben Gilman (R-NY) of the House International Relations Committee stated "we are hearing from certain Turkish officials that the present situation on Cyprus, a division of the island and 35,000 Turkish troops is a solution, their solution. This of course is completely unacceptable to our nation and the international community." On May 15, 1997 House of Representatives Concurrent Resolution 81 stated: "The status quo on Cyprus is unacceptable and detrimental to the interests of the United States in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond."

The European Union

During this period, the European Union started to play a more prominent role. Following the decision of the December 12-13, 1997 European Council held in Luxembourg, the European Union began formal accession negotiations with Cyprus on March 31, 1998. The substantive phase began on November 10, 1998.

Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot Side

During this period, Turkey asserted itself, in the words of then Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz on June 2 1997, as the "primary interlocutor" on Cyprus. The search for a settlement repeatedly encountered entrenched resistance on the Turkish side, where a hard-line approach heavily influenced by the geo-strategic calculations of the Turkish military predominated. For example, on May 13, 1998 retired Admiral Dogan Beyazit said that "Cyprus is located on a strategic sea-route in the Mediterranean, is near to the oil wells and is vital for Turkey's future."

Turkey's approach during these years sought to transform the occupied areas into an independent sovereign entity and thus to make permanent the partition of Cyprus. On January 12, 1999, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit stated that "the reality of two separate states in Cyprus cannot be denied." On December 23, 1998 Turkey criticized the UN initiative stating that "accepting the existence of two separate sovereign and equal states emerges as a necessity in the Cyprus question." On November 15, 1998, Mr. Sukru Sina Gurel, the Turkish Minister of State responsible for Cyprus affairs, stated that "the existence of two separate peoples, orders, and states on the island must be acknowledged."

This approach followed on Turkey's very negative reaction to the December 1997 EU decision to commence accession negotiations with Cyprus. On December 14, 1997, then Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz stated that Turkey would "intensify integration" between the illegally occupied parts of Cyprus and Turkey. On January 4, 1998 he stated that the EU decision would result in the permanent partition of Cyprus. The Turkish government also tried to draw a link between its own aspirations for EU membership and a Cyprus settlement.

During the period, Turkey took steps to further the integration of the illegally occupied parts of Cyprus into Turkey. On July 20, 1997, Mr. Denktash and Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, who as Turkish Prime Minister in 1974 launched the illegal invasion of that date, signed a joint declaration setting out proposals for the full-scale political, economic, and defense integration into Turkey of the occupied areas of Cyprus. On August 6, Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem signed an agreement with Mr. Denktash that set up an "association council" to determine the measures to be taken for partial integration between Turkey and the occupied areas and to monitor their implementation. On January 12, 1998, Turkey signed a "Functional and Structural Cooperation Protocol" with the occupied area.

These moves have been condemned by the international community, including the U.S. Administration. On August 7, 1997 the State Department spokesman described the "association council" as unhelpful and called upon its sponsors not to take "any steps that undermine the UN negotiation process or which move toward the permanent partition of the island."

Throughout 1998 senior Turkish officials made repeated threats to take military action if Cyprus implemented its proposal to acquire the anti-aircraft defensive S-300 missile system. On June 2, 1998, for example, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister and National Defense Minister Ismet Sezgin confirmed that the Turkish general staff had prepared "all the necessary measures" in the event of the system's deployment in Cyprus. Although this proposal was cancelled by the Cyprus Government on December 29, 1998, the belligerent saber-rattling instigated by the Turkish military underlines the fact that Cyprus remains an international flashpoint.

Turkish Cypriot attitudes were also negative. On March 2, 1999, Mr. Denktash stated that "there is no meaning in sitting at the negotiating table." On December 23, 1998 Mr. Denktash rejected the UN initiative stating that "The only choice left to us is to resist." This negative approach followed a similarly rejectionist reaction to the opening of substantive EU negotiations on November 10, 1998. Mr. Denktash released a statement affirming that the occupied areas would move toward full integration with Turkey. This negative approach has been characteristic of Mr. Denktash over the past years. On a visit to Washington in October 1997 Mr. Denktash described himself as "Mr. No." Before the opening of EU negotiations with Cyprus, Mr. Denktash spoke of the possibility of war should these commence.

In the wake of the EU decision on negotiations with Cyprus, Mr. Denktash cut off all intercommunal contacts in Cyprus and demanded international recognition of the illegal Turkish Cypriot entity and the withdrawal of Cyprus' EU application. He refused to participate in the Cypriot delegation to the accession negotiations, although invited to do so by the Cypriot government and the EU. These acts drew criticism from within the Turkish Cypriot community. On September 2, 1998 Turkish Cypriot opposition leader Mehmet Ali Talat stated that Denktash's approach "contradicts all previous understandings, the summit agreements, as well as the UN resolutions" and "does not serve the interests of the Turkish Cypriots."

Turkish intransigence attracted American criticism. Following his visit to Cyprus on May 1-3, 1998, Ambassador Holbrooke and the State Department spokesman publicly blamed the Turkish side for the resultant deadlock. Ambassador Holbrooke stated that "the reason we could not make progress this time was because the Turkish side has changed its position." On May 5, 1998 then EU Commissioner for External Affairs Hans van den Broek reiterated this criticism, stating "Mr. Denktash's terms cannot be accepted and his stance has confirmed his intransigence." On June 10, 1998, Senator Joe Biden, Ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, spoke of "a stone wall of Turkish Cypriot obduracy in the form of two preconditions: recognition of the 'TRNC' and withdrawal of Cyprus' application to the European Union."

The overall effect of these attitudes was to cause Turkey to be generally unwilling to enter substantive negotiations and to instruct the Turkish Cypriots to adopt an intransigent approach, for example their demand to be treated as a sovereign state, described by Prime Minister Ecevit on January 11, 1999 as "very appropriate and supported by our government."

Part 3: Prospects

There are some favorable factors: the sense that a settlement is overdue and that it would confer substantial regional benefits; full cooperation from the Cyrus government; warmer relations between Greece and Turkey; the EU's commitment to Cyprus' accession and its requirement on Turkey that a Cyprus settlement is a pre-condition for Turkish accession negotiations; and the strong consensus in the G8 and the UN about the framework for an eventual settlement. Against these, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot attitudes remain strongly negative, with neither party wholeheartedly committed to the negotiation process. To date, the latter factors have predominated with little progress being made despite the continuing efforts of the international community.

At present Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are focusing their efforts on legitimizing de facto partition brought about by the Turkish invasion and on suspending Cyprus' EU accession negotiations. In 2000 Mr. Denktash has reiterated this demand many times and drawn immediate support from Turkey. These obstacles on the Turkish side have a familiar ring. In May 1994, for example, the UN Secretary-General reported that the Security Council "found itself faced with an already familiar scenario: the absence of agreement due essentially to the lack of political will on the part of the Turkish Cypriot community."

If this approach continues, the prognosis for progress is bleak. If, on the other hand, the Turkish side is prepared to offer concrete evidence that it is ready to enter into good faith negotiations based on the principles set out in the High Level Agreements and SCR 939, including internationally enforceable guarantees that meet the concerns of all Cypriots within a single unified state, a settlement may be within reach.

In seeking a settlement, the role of the international community, the EU, international organizations, and national parliaments will be critical. A leading role for the U.S. will be indispensable. Only the U.S. has the range of regional economic, political, and security relationships that will be necessary to persuade the interested parties--first and foremost Turkey--to commit themselves to a good faith negotiations. U.S. willingness to engage the Turkish military is of the greatest importance. The Turkish constitution grants the military far greater prerogatives over foreign policy and national security matters than is normal in western democracies. For all practical purposes, the final decisions over Cyprus will be made by the military not by the civilian leadership. To date, U.S. administrations have shown little willingness to apply the necessary pressure on the Turkish military.

In setting the course of U.S. policy, Congressional opinion will be vital. Congress is an essential partner in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy and must play its constitutional role in shaping U.S. policy toward the Cyprus problem.

STATEMENT OF AHI POLICY

The Cyprus problem has been on the international agenda for many years and most prominently since Turkey's illegal 1974 invasion. Years of negotiation and international initiatives have foundered on the barrier of the military-controlled Turkish government's intransigence. The absence of progress damages important national interests of the United States in the Eastern Mediterranean and compromises fundamental American values such as rejection of aggression and respect for the rule of law. The time has come for a realistic approach in which the U.S. engages the true issues.

Turkish obstructionism is not the only guilty party. Faulty U.S. policy is also responsible for the damaging failure to produce a settlement. It is time to recognize that the U.S. approach adopted since 1974 of treating Cyprus as a traditional diplomatic problem where 'meet-in-the-middle' negotiations involving compromises by each side has failed. Despite compromises made by Cyprus, Turkey has not reciprocated. To break the deadlock, the U.S. must follow a realistic approach based on the fundamentally clear and straightforward issues underlying the Cyprus problem. These are:

• The Cyprus problem is one of aggression, illegal occupation and attempted dismemberment by Turkey, whereby the Republic of Cyprus is the victim and Turkey is the aggressor. There is no difference in principle between Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and Turkey's invasion of Cyprus. Indeed, as a U.S. NATO ally and EU aspirant Turkey should be held to the highest standards of compliance with international law.
• For 24 years, Turkey has violated the will of the United States and the United Nations to cease its illegal occupation of Cyprus and not to recognize or give any other assistance to the illegally occupied areas. Instead it has reinforced its forces there and illegally sent Turkish settlers there.
• The United States bears a national responsibility for the Cyprus tragedy. Speaking publicly in Nicosia on November 11, 1997 Ambassador Richard Holbrooke described U.S. actions in 1974 as "shameful." At a Capitol Hill conference on Cyprus on June 10, 1998 Ambassador Tom Boyatt, the State Department's Cyprus desk officer in 1974, stated that "a Cyprus solution is possible if the U.S. steps up to its responsibilities and remembers its own guilt. So we have a redemption factor here."

The time has come to restore these essential facts to the center of policy. Turkey is overwhelmingly responsible for the Cyprus problem by its aggression and illegal occupation. Instead of a barren process of negotiation which allows Turkey to deny this fact and the U.S. to divert attention from the real issues, the Administration should now:

• State that it is ending its current approach and that future talks will take place on the basis of restoring the status quo ante and the rule of law as it applied before Turkey's 1974 illegal invasion.
• Identify Turkey and its military-dominated government as the responsible party for the Cyprus problem and recognize that the Turkish military is the key, not Mr. Denktash.
• Demand that Turkey complies immediately with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions, cease all measures to integrate the occupied areas with Turkey, immediately withdraw all occupation troops, and agree to the demilitarization of the island.
• Demand the restoration of constitutional government for all of Cyprus based on majority rule, the rule of law, and protection of minority rights.
• Institute a realistic diplomatic approach including coercive measures against Turkey such as sanctions and denial of assistance from the international financial institutions in the event of Turkish non-compliance or any further violation of international law by Turkey in Cyprus.

Glossary of Terms

(the following definitions seek to reflect conventional international usage).

The Republic of Cyprus: this is the only legitimate state on Cyprus. It is a member of the UN, the British Commonwealth, and the Council of Europe. Its territory extends to the entire island of Cyprus. Its form of government is a presidential, multi-party democracy.

The Government of Cyprus: this is only internationally recognized government in Cyprus. The current president is Glafcos Clerides.

The "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus": this is the illegal administration in the area under Turkish occupation. Under SCR 541 (1983) this administration has no international validity or legal status. No state other than Turkey has recognized this entity.

Bicommunal: this recognizes that, within the framework of a unified state, there are two communities in Cyprus, each of which is entitled to constitutionally protected rights and powers. This characterizes the fundamental nature of the proposed federation.

Bizonal: this recognizes that there would be two federated states in Cyprus, each of which would enjoy substantial autonomy on internal matters.

Buffer zone: this is the strip of land between the cease-fire lines patrolled by UNFICYP.

Cease-fire Lines: these are the 1974 cease fire lines of the Cyprus National Guard and the Turkish invasion force. South of the line is the area under Cyprus government control; north of the line is the area under Turkish occupation.

Confidence-Building Measures: these have included agreement to open the fenced area of Famagusta and to reopen the international airport of Nicosia and other projects of bicommunal cooperation.

Demilitarization: this means the removal of all foreign forces from Cyprus and the total disbanding of all Cypriot forces. (This does not include British troops on the UK sovereign bases areas.) A comprehensive proposal for demilitarization was submitted to the UN by President Clerides in December 1993.

Enclaved: these are the Greek and Maronite populations in the areas under Turkish military occupation. Despite the provisions of the Vienna III agreement under which Turkey guaranteed their basic rights, their numbers have declined from 20,000 in 1974 to less than 500 today.

Federation: this implies a unified, central, and federal Government of Cyprus with exclusive sovereignty and with sufficient powers to ensure the unity of the state; it is to be distinguished from a confederation which implies two or more co-existent sovereign authorities joined together loosely.

Guarantor Powers: in the treaties establishing Cyprus' independence in 1960 certain rights were reserved to Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom as guarantor powers.

High-Level Agreements: in 1977 and 1979 agreements were reached between the then Presidents of Cyprus, respectively Archbishop Makarios and Mr. Spiros Kyprianou, and the Turkish Cypriot leader Mr. Denktash about the basic principles required for a Cyprus settlement.

Human Rights: violations by the Turkish occupying forces have been recorded by many international organizations. In addition to the abuse of individual rights, violations have included destruction of cultural and religious heritage.

Indirect military talks: this refers to a proposal for talks between the Cyprus National Guard and the Turkish military authorities under the auspices of UNFICYP.

Missing Persons: this refers to a group of over 1,600 Greek Cypriots (including civilians) known to have been in the hands of the Turkish military after the conclusion of hostilities in 1974 but whose fate is unknown. 5 US citizens are numbered among the missing.

Multinational Force: this refers to a proposal under which, following agreement on a settlement, UNFICYP would be replaced by a multinational force under an international commander with a Security Council mandate. Both Turkey and Greece could contribute contingents to the force. The force would have responsibility for overseeing the security aspects of a constitutional settlement.

Partition, Secession (taksim): these concepts imply the establishment of two or more sovereign entities on Cyprus and thus offend against the concept of federation.

Politically equal: this means that both communities must have equal political status and be able to participate in the political process effectively. It does not imply precise numerical equality.

Presidential campaign statements:

Jimmy Carter: "The impasse on Cyprus must be broken down. The U.S. must be prepared to work...to insure the independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of Cyprus." 1976

Ronald Reagan: "The tragic situation in Cyprus has lasted six years. It must not continue. I support UN GA Resolution 3212" 1980

George Bush: "We seek for Cyprus a constitutional democracy based on majority rule, the rule of law, and the protection of minority rights." 1988

Bill Clinton: "The U.S. and the world community will not accept the permanent division of Cyprus. Such a settlement must be consistent with the fundamental principles of human rights." 1992

Bill Clinton: "I have made the resolution of the Cyprus problem a high foreign policy priority." 1996

Refugees: following the 1974 invasion some 200,00 Greek Cypriots were forced to leave their homes. This constituted approximately 80% of the population in what is now the area under Turkish military occupation.

Set of Ideas: put forward by the UN Secretary-General in 1989 as the basis for advancing negotiations. The ideas were subsequently reformulated and endorsed by SCR 774 (1992) of August, 1992. For the purposes of the ensuing discussions, these proposals were provisionally accepted by the Greek Cypriots but were rejected by the Turkish Cypriots.

Settlement, Colonization, Displacement: this refers to the illegal importation of over 100,000 settlers from Turkey onto Cyprus. Figures from 1996 indicate that, together with emigration of Turkish Cypriots, this has had the effect of changing the demography of Cyprus to the extent that native-born Turkish Cypriots are now in a minority in the area under Turkish occupation. Such deliberate demographic changes are illegal under the Geneva Convention.

Single citizenship: this means that all Cyprus citizens will enjoy a single citizenship regulated by the central government. No community would be able to confer citizenship.

Single International Personality: this means that, in its dealings with foreign entities and on all international matters, sole authority is vested in the central federal government.

Sovereign Base Areas: these areas cover 99 square miles. They were retained by the UK in 1960. They are not considered part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

Territorial apportionment: in the course of formulating the "set of ideas" a map, the "Ghali map", containing certain proposals for territorial adjustments was put forward by the UN Secretary-General. These proposals were rejected by the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

Treaty of Alliance: this refers to the 1960 Treaty between Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus under which Greece and Turkey are permitted to station, respectively, 950 and 650 troops on Cyprus.

Treaty of Establishment: this refers to the 1960 treaty between UK, Greece, Turkey, and the Republic of Cyprus that brought about the independence of Cyprus.

Treaty of Guarantee: this refers to the 1960 Treaty between Britain, Greece, and Turkey on the one part and the republic of Cyprus on the other part that afforded each state certain rights of intervention in order to maintain the constitutional status quo. Security guarantees(short of unilateral rights(will be a key component of any settlement agreement.

UNFICYP: this is the UN force in Cyprus. First installed in 1964, the majority of costs are now met by voluntary contributions from the governments of Cyprus and Greece.

Unified state: this implies a central and federal state of Cyprus with exclusive sovereignty and with sufficient powers to ensure the unity of the state

Union with another Country (enosis) : this refers to jurisdictional mergers with foreign nation states. It does not refer to membership of multilateral or regional organizations, such as the EU or British Commonwealth.

Unmanning: this refers to a 1989 agreement to pull back Cyprus National Guard and Turkish military personnel from positions along the cease-fire lines, particularly within Nicosia.

July 20, 2000